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Visual imagery typically enables us to see absent items in the mind’s eye. It plays a role in memory, 
day-dreaming and creativity. Since coining the terms aphantasia and hyperphantasia to describe 
the absence and abundance of visual imagery, we have been contacted by many thousands of 
people with extreme imagery abilities. Questionnaire data from 2000 participants with aphantasia 
and 200 with hyperphantasia indicate that aphantasia is associated with scientific and 
mathematical occupations, whereas hyperphantasia is associated with ‘creative’ professions. 
Participants with aphantasia report an elevated rate of difficulty with face recognition and 
autobiographical memory, whereas participants with hyperphantasia report an elevated rate of 
synaesthesia. Around half those with aphantasia describe an absence of wakeful imagery in all 
sense modalities, while a majority dream visually. Aphantasia appears to run within families more 
often than would be expected by chance. Aphantasia and hyperphantasia appear to be widespread 






1.  Introduction 
Visual imagery typically allows us to inspect absent items in the ‘mind’s eye’, somewhat as if we were 
seeing them (Pearson, Naselaris, Holmes, & Kosslyn, 2015). For most of us such imagery is a ubiquitous 
element of experience, evoked by vivid memories, compelling descriptions, dreams and day-dreams 
(Brosch, 2018; Schacter & Addis, 2007; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). Modulating emotion, fuelling 
cravings in addiction and aiding therapists in treatment (Holmes & Mathews, 2010), it is harnessed by 
teachers and trainers in mental practice (Munzert, 2013), and used to facilitate communication 
following profound brain injury (Owen et al., 2006). It plays a role in creativity in both the sciences and 
the arts (Shepard, 1988). Variations in the vividness of visual imagery were first studied systematically 
by the British psychologist, Sir Francis Galton, in the nineteenth century, who  invited participants to 
rate the ‘illumination, definition and colouring’ of ‘your breakfast table as you sat down to it this 
morning’ (Galton, 1880). He recognised that in some participants ‘the power of visualisation was zero’. 
However, this phenomenon, the apparently lifelong lack of a mind’s eye, has been neglected until very 
recently, with the exception of a single study suggesting a prevalence of 2-3%(Faw, 2009) and our 
previous report, coining the term aphantasia (Zeman, Dewar, & Della Sala, 2015). Galton also reported 
that imagery vividness was associated with occupation (Galton, 1880), with a tendency toward fainter 
imagery among ‘men of science’, though this was subsequently challenged (Brewer & Schommer-
Aikins, 2006). 
Previous research, focussing on less extreme variations in imagery vividness, has associated imagery 
vividness and utilisation with cognitive peformance and neural activity in several psychological 
domains. Studies on both healthy and clinical populations have linked the vididness, richness and 
fluency of autobiographical memory to imagery vividness (D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006; 
Greenberg & Knowlton, 2014; Rubin & Greenberg, 1998; Vannucci, Pelagatti, Chiorri, & Mazzoni, 
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2016). The neural mechanisms for these effects include both activation within and connectivity to 
visual cortices (Daselaar et al., 2008; Gilboa, Winocur, Grady, Hevenor, & Moscovitch, 2004; Sheldon, 
Farb, Palombo, & Levine, 2016). These is evidence for a relationship, also, between imagery strength, 
as assessed using the binocular rivalry paradigm, and the capacity of visual working memory (Keogh 
& Pearson, 2014). In the domain of visual perception, imagery vividness has been related to some 
higher-order perceptual skills. Gruter et al. (Gruter, Gruter, Bell, & Carbon, 2009) reported that the 
mean VVIQ score among individuals with congenital prosopagnosia (difficulty with familiar face 
recognition) was between two and three standard deviations below the normal participant mean. In 
contrast, Barnett and Newell (Barnett & Newell, 2008) found elevated vividness scores among 
individuals with synaesthesia (‘merging of the senses’). Vivid ‘object imagery’ has been associated 
specifically with an enhanced ability to identify degraded figures (Blazhenkova & Kozhevnikov, 2010) 
and filtered visual stimuli at low spatial frequencies (Vannucci, Mazzoni, Chiorri, & Cioli, 2008)  and to 
distinguish degrees of ‘grain’ (Blazhenkova & Kozhevnikov, 2010). Variations in imagery vividness are  
also associated with the risk of several psychiatric disorders: average imagery vividness is raised in 
patients with schizophrenia and their first degree relatives(Oertel et al., 2009), while higher levels 
predispose to more frequent flashbacks in an experimental model of Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder(Morina, Leibold, & Ehring, 2013), and to hallucinations in Parkinson’s Disease(Shine et al., 
2015).  More broadly, these findings from the study of memory and perception and mental health 
resonate with a long tradition of work on individual differences in cognition, including Paivio’s ‘dual 
coding theory’ and its more recent descendants (Otis, 2015). Failure to consider individual differences 
in the approach to solving cognitive tasks – for example the use of verbal vs visual strategies – has 
sometimes impeded the analysis of task performance (Logie, 2018; Pearson, 2019)). 
In this paper, we revisit Galton’s early discovery that in some individuals the ‘powers [of visualisation] 
are zero’.  In 2015, in a letter to this journal, we described 21 individuals with lifelong absence of the 
mind’s eye, coining the term ‘aphantasia’ , adapted from Aristotle’s word for the mind’s eye, 
φαντασία (‘phantasia’)(8), to refer to this phenomenon (Zeman, Dewar, & Della Sala, 2015). Since 
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then, studies by other investigators have identified several potential objective correlates of 
aphantasia: loss of the usual priming effect of imagery in binocular rivalry(Keogh & Pearson, 2018), 
suggesting that the underlying cause of aphantasia is sensory rather than metacognitive; absence of 
the usual autonomic response to stories that would normally be expected to excite emotive imagery 
(Wicken, Keogh, & Pearson, 2019a); reduction in the precision of visual working memory, reported in 
a single case (Jacobs, Schwarzkopf, & Silvanto, 2018). A further study, in keeping with the findings of 
Keogh & Pearson (Keogh & Pearson, 2018) indicates that the aphantasia is likely to reflect a selective 
reduction in ‘object imagery’ as opposed to ‘spatial imagery’ (Bainbridge, Pounder, Eardley, & Baker, 
2020).  A personal account of aphantasia (Watkins, 2017) has highlighted a possible association with 
the recently described syndrome of Severely Deficient Autobiographical memory (Palombo, Alain, 
Soderlund, Khuu, & Levine, 2015).  The description of aphantasia has also redirected attention to the 
opposite extreme of the vividness spectrum, which we have termed ‘hyperphantasia’, imagery ‘as 
vivid as real seeing’. While hyperphantasia, like aphantasia, has been neglected in recent psychological 
research, the phenomenon may be linked ‘eidetic’ or ‘photographic’ imagery, which was a focus of 
attention in visual psychology in the early 20th century (Pearson, 2019).  
Following extensive media interest in our 2015 paper, which stimulated a sustained surge of ‘citizen 
science’, we have been contacted by over 14,000 individuals from around the world, reporting 
extreme imagery. Altmetric statistics indicate that the public interest generated by our 2015 Letter 
places it in the top 1% of scientific outputs in this respect (Altmetric 407 on 9th February 2020), 
reflecting strong lay curiosity about invisible differences in imaginative experience.  This large sample 
creates a unique opportunity to address the significance of visual imagery extremes, exploring both 
questions that have been unresolved since Galton’s first report, such as the professional associations 
of extreme imagery vividness and their associated gender ratios, and questions raised by the more 
recent studies cited above.  
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On the basis of Galton’s observation that scientific professions were associated overall with low 
imagery vividness, and the related findings of Blazhenkova & Kozhevnikov (2010), we hypothesised 
that individuals with aphantasia and hyperphantasia would differ in occupational preference, with a 
bias toward the sciences among those with aphantasia.  The findings described briefly above, linking 
higher levels of imagery vividness to stronger autobiographical memory, and associating face 
recognition difficulty with lower level of imagery vividness, taken together with our previous findings 
(Zeman, Dewar, & Della Sala, 2015), prompted the hypothesis that individuals with aphantasia would 
be more likely to report difficulty in these domains.  Following the observation of Barnett and Newell 
we anticipated an elevated rate of synaesthesia among participants with hyperphantasia.  Finally, on 
the basis of our previous results (Zeman, Dewar, & Della Sala, 2015), we predicted that wakeful and 
dreaming imagery would dissociate, involvement of imagery in other sense modalities would be 
variable, and imagery extremes would cluster within families.   
2.  Methods 
We report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions (if any), all inclusion/exclusion 
criteria, whether inclusion/exclusion criteria were established prior to data analysis, all manipulations, 
and all measures in the study 
2.1 Questionnaires.  
We responded to media-inspired contacts from members of the public reporting exceptionally faint 
or vivid imagery with a request that they complete two questionnaires: i) a modified version of the 
Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire(Marks, 1973) (VVIQ), reversing the original order of the 
vividness scale so that higher scores correspond, intuitively, to more vivid imagery (VVIQ scores range 
from 16/80 – 80/80); ii) a questionnaire adapted from our previous study (Zeman, Dewar, & Della Sala, 
2015), the Imagery Questionnaire (IQ), to probe potentially relevant characteristics of individuals with 
extreme imagery. Both questionnaires were originally sent to participants via email and completed as 
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Microsoft Word documents. More recently they have been completed by participants on-line, using 
Limesurvey initially, and subsequently Snapsurvey). The IQ underwent minor modifications between 
administration formats for practical reasons but the essential content was preserved. One question, 
relating to ‘difficulty in recognising faces or objects’ was changed to ‘difficulty in recognising faces’ as 
neither aphantasic or hyperphantasic participants reported object recognition difficulty. Following 
spontaneous mention of synaesthesia by several participants with hyperphantasia, a question about 
synaesthesia was added. Control participants (see below) completed the VVIQ and a modified version 
of the IQ (see supplementary material for full details of the questionnaires and their administration. 
Once again, we preserved the essential content of the questionnaire). 
2.2 Participants.  
Between June 2015 and March 2018 we received 2000 consecutive fully completed sets of 
questionnaires from participants with aphantasia, defined as VVIQ scores of 16-23/80, 200 from 
participants with hyperphantasia, defined as scores of 75-80/80, and 200 from participants with mid-
range scores of 51-63/80, selected on the basis of previous work (McKelvie, 1995; Zeman, Dewar, & 
Della Sala, 2015) indicating mean and median VVIQ scores falling between 55 and 60 in large 
populations. Our aphantasic and hyperphantasic samples were opportunistic, in the sense that our 
participants had approached us spontaneously following publicity triggered by our original 
publication: we reasoned that a sample of aphantasic participants 100 times greater than we had 
previously reported was likely to be informative. Control participants were recruited from among 1288 
members of a local Biobank, EXTEND (http://exeter.crf.nihr.ac.uk/extend) who had responded to a 
request to complete the VVIQ. We distinguished participants with extreme and moderate aphantasia 
and hyperphantasia (VVIQ scores 16/80 vs 17-23/80, 80/80 vs 75-79/80 respectively): as findings in 
the extreme and moderate groups were qualitatively similar, we primarily present the combined 
group data here (see supplementary material for subgroup comparisons). We excluded participants 
who indicated that their aphantasia was acquired (i.e. that they had previously experienced imagery, 
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but had lost their mind’s eye) as this often resulted from events such as head injury or stroke which 
might have more widespread effects on cognition, unrelated to aphantasia. We did not have other 
exclusion criteria as we wished to capture the features of aphantasia and hyperphantasia without 
further qualification in this initial study. Our exclusion criteria were predetermined. We received 
approval for our questionnaire study with participants with extreme vividness scores from the Exeter 
Medical School Ethics Committee, and for our work with EXTEND participants from the University of 
Exeter Psychology Research Ethics Committee.  
2.3 Analysis and Statistics.  
Questionnaire data were entered into an Excel spread sheet, and where possible coded numerically 
to allow statistical comparisons (see supplementary material for full details of data fields and coding 
categories). Coding of the questionnaires completed in Word (n = 1460), which asked open-ended 
questions, was undertaken by two researchers (JG, BH-W) who were not blind to participant group. In 
rare cases of disagreement, a consensus was agreed with the help of a third researcher (CW or AZ). 
The questionnaires completed on-line (n = 940) provided, where feasible, drop-down menus with 
response options corresponding to the coding categories, with additional opportunity for free-text 
responses. 
  Our primary analyses examine differences between the aphantasia and hyperphantasia groups (and 
where appropriate also the control group) on a broad range of fifteen key characteristics. Differences 
were first investigated using omnibus contingency chi-square. For these analyses, we corrected for 
multiple comparisons using Bonferroni corrections with a corrected p = .003 (.05/15). When the 
overall analysis was significant, we performed follow-up post-hoc comparisons with the adjusted 
standardised residuals to interpret the effect. Following the recommendations of Macdonald & 
Gardner(Macdonald, 2000), Bonferroni corrections for multiple comparisons were conducted for 
these post-hoc comparisons (p =.05/the number of cells in the particular contingency chi-square). We 
also conducted cell-wise comparisons to assess whether there were any differences between groups. 
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Groups were considered to differ significantly should the cells for each group be statistically 
significant, according to the criteria outlined above, in the opposite direction to each other. The 
requirement for both cells to be significant, if anything, errs on the side of being conservative. For 
each of the 15 topics, we also conducted supplementary analyses to characterise our data further. 
First, given that there was a higher proportion of females in the hyperphantasia group than the 
aphantasia and control groups, we ran analyses on males and females separately to ascertain whether 
the same basic patterns for the all participant comparisons still emerged. In addition, we examined 
whether there were any differences between the extreme aphantasia/moderate aphantasia groups 
and the extreme hyperphantasia/moderate hyperphantasia groups (see supplementary material). For 
these follow-up analyses corrections for multiple comparisons were conducted as described above for 
the primary analyses. 
The conditions of our ethics approval do not permit public archiving of the data supporting this study. 
Readers seeking access to the data should contact the lead author who will confer with the University 
of Exeter Ethics committee. Access will be granted to named individuals as appropriate in accordance 
with ethical procedures governing the reuse of sensitive data. Specifically, requestors will be 
requested to complete a formal data sharing agreement. 
3.  Results  
3.1  VVIQ and demographics (Table 1).  
Hyperphantasic participants had a significantly higher VVIQ score than those in either the control, t 
(398) = 75.042, p < .001, d = 7.505, or aphantasia groups, t (2198) = 421.126, p <.001, d = 33.387. 
Aphantasic participants had a significantly lower VVIQ than the control group, t (2198) = 251.475, p 
<.001, d = 14.146. A contingency chi-square revealed a significant difference in gender across the 
groups, χ² (2, 2371) = 21.704, p <.001, reflecting a bias toward females in the hyperphantasia group. 
There was a significant difference between groups in education, χ² (2, 2276) = 20.312, p <.001, 
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reflecting lower educational attainment among the control participants. Independent samples t-tests 
revealed no significant difference in age between the aphantasia and hyperphantasia groups, t(2180) 
= .472, p = .637, d = .037, but the control group was significantly older than both the aphantasia, t 
(2160) = 12.194,  p < .001, d = .974, and hyperphantasia, t (374) = 9.827, p <.001, d = 1.012, groups. 
We consider it unlikely that these differences in age and education will have influenced the 
comparisons in which the control group is included below, but note that the comparisons of primary 
interest in each case are those between the aphantasic and hyerphantasic groups. 
Table 1 Vividness scores, age, gender and education in the three study groups  
 Aphantasia Hyperphantasia Controls 
VVIQ (mean) 17.06              
(SD = 1.983) 
78.16                      
(SD = 1.663) 
57.49                     
(SD = 3.522) 
Age (mean) 41.31             
(SD = 16.307) 
41.87                  
(SD = 13.971) 
56.80               
(SD = 15.489) 
Gender (male:female) 993:981    
(50.3%:49.7%) 




Education level (No degree/Degree or > 
15 years education) 







3.2  Autobiographical memory (Figure 1a).  
An omnibus contingency chi-square yielded a significant difference in autobiographical memory 
between groups, χ² (6, 2379) = 233.125, p <.001. Post-hoc comparisons revealed that people with 
hyperphantasia were more likely to report good memory than either people with aphantasia or the 
control group. Conversely, the aphantasia group were more likely to say their memory was bad than 
the hyperphantasia and control groups, whilst the control group were more likely to say their memory 
was normal than the hyperphantasia and aphantasia groups. Similar patterns emerged for female and 
male participants analysed separately (see SI).  
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3.3  Face recognition (Figure 1b).  
There was a significant difference between groups, χ² (2, 2078) = 84.621, p <.001, with participants in 
the aphantasia group reporting significantly higher levels of face recognition difficulties than 
participants in either the hyperphantasia or control groups. Similar patterns emerged for female and 
male participants analysed separately (see supplementary material).  
3.4  Visual imagery in dreams (Figure 2a).  
There was a significant difference between groups, χ² (2, 2398) = 146.264, p <.001. Post-hoc 
comparisons revealed that participants in the aphantasia group were less likely to experience visual 
imagery in dreams than either the hyperphantasia or the control groups (specifically, 20.7% of 
aphantasic participants reported that they dream without images, while 7.5% reported that they do 
not dream at all; comparable percentages in the control group were 6.5% and 0.5%, and in the 
hyperphantasic group 0.5% and 0%). The same basic pattern emerged for male and female 
participants analysed separately (see supplementary material). The participants who reported avisual 
dreams described narrative, textual, conceptual, auditory and emotional dream content.  
3.5  Influence of mood (Figure 2b).  
There was a significant difference across groups, χ² (4, 2396) = 648.685, p <.001 with the aphantasia 
group significantly less likely to report that mood influenced their imagery than participants in either 
the hyperphantasia or control groups. These results were the same for both male and female 
participants. 
3.6  Synaesthesia (Figure 2c).  
The omnibus chi-square yielded a significant effect, χ² (2, 629) = 68.051, p <.001. Post-hoc analyses 
showed that participants with aphantasia were significantly less likely to report the experience of 
synaesthesia than participants in the hyperphantasia group. The control group did not differ from the 
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expected values. For females the results were identical to the all-participant analyses. For males, there 
was again a difference between groups, χ² (2, 273) = 13.230, p <.001, with the hyperphantasia group 
more likely to experience synaesthesia than chance, although none of the cell-wise comparisons were 
significant. 
3.7  The ‘windows task’ (Figure 3a).  
This task required participants to count the number of windows in the house or apartment mentally. 
There was a significant difference in the distributions, χ² (4, 2281) = 1719.768, p <.001 with the 
aphantasia group significantly less likely than either the hyperphantasia or the control group to use 
visual imagery strategies to accomplish this task. Instead, the aphantasia participants were 
significantly more likely to use alternative, non-imagery, strategies - including the use of avisual spatial 
imagery, kinaesthetic imagery and amodal ‘knowledge’ - than the hyperphantasia and control groups. 
These results were identical when considering males and females separately. 
3.8  Effect of eye opening (Figure 3b).  
The omnibus chi-square revealed an overall significant effect, χ² (4, 2396) = 136.673, p <.001 with the 
aphantasia group significantly less likely to report an effect of eye opening vs eye closure on imagery 
vividness than the control group. This same pattern emerged for both male and female participants 
(see supplementary material for full analyses).  
3.9 Occupation (Figure 4).   
The remaining analyses were conducted only on data from the aphantasia and hyperphantasia 
groups, as they relate to the experience or occurrence of extreme imagery or, in the case of 
occupation, to level of education, which was lower in the control group and would be expected to 
have a confounding effect.  
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For occupation, the contingency chi-square revealed a significant result, χ² (21, 1752) = 84.516, p 
<.001. Post-hoc analyses revealed that people in the aphantasia group were significantly less likely to 
be in ‘Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media Occupations’ than hyperphantasia participants. 
In contrast, a significantly greater proportion of people with aphantasia were working in professions 
classified as ‘Computer and Mathematical’/ ‘Life, Physical and Social Sciences’ (we combined these 
two categories in the analysis given their intuitive relationship, and the prior hypothesis that 
aphantasia was associated with scientific occupations). We excluded the ‘unemployed/no answer’ 
category from these analyses.  
3.10  Age and mode of discovery (Figure 5).  
The contingency chi-square revealed that there was a significant difference between groups in the age 
at which participants recognised that their imagery vividness lay at an extreme, χ² (2, 2194) = 47.282, 
p <.001.  Post-hoc comparisons showed that this reflected a lower likelihood for participants in the 
aphantasia group than for participants in the hyperphantasia group to become aware of their 
condition in the first two decades of life. The same pattern emerged for both male and female 
participants. There was also a significant difference between groups with respect to the mode of 
discovery, χ² (8, 2123) = 64.999, p <.001.  Post-hoc comparisons showed that people with 
hyperphantasia were significantly more likely to discover their condition via art than people with 
aphantasia (see supplementary material for sex-specific analyses).  
3.11  Family history (Figure 6a).   
There was a significant difference between the groups, χ² (3, 2133) = 48.238, p <.001. Aphantasic 
participants were significantly more likely to report ‘no family members’ have a similar condition than 
hyperphantasic participants. Conversely, hyperphantasic participants were significantly more likely 
than aphantasic participants to say that ‘maybe one’ family remember was affected (see 
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supplementary material for sex-specific analyses). We consider whether participants with extreme 
imagery report ‘affected’ relatives more often than would be expected by chance further below.  
3.12 Other modalities of imagery (Figure 6b).  
35.8% of participants with aphantasia and 42.2% of participants with hyperphantasia reported that at 
least one other modality was unaffected (i.e. normal or vivid in the case of participants with 
aphantasia, normal or faint in the case of participants with hyperphantasia); conversely, 54.2% of 
aphantasic participants and 47.8% of hyperphantasic participants reported that all modalities of 
imagery were faint or vivid respectively. The chi-square was not significant, χ² (2, 2129) = 2.718, p = 
.257, indicating no differences between the aphantasia and hyperphantasia groups. For male 
participants, there was a trend for a difference (p = .036) but this did not survive corrections for 
multiple comparisons. For females there was also no significant effect (p = .451). 
3.13 Emotional impact, perceived advantages, relationships (Figure 7).  
While an emotional impact was common, the chi-square revealed no significant differences in the 
distribution between the two groups, χ² (4, 2172) = 2.151, p = .708.  There was a significant difference 
between groups in the rate of perceived advantage, χ² (2, 2157) = 114.016, p <.001. Post-hoc 
comparisons revealed that participants in the aphantasia group were significantly less likely than the 
participants in the hyperphantasia group to see their condition as advantageous. The aphantasia 
group was also more likely to say that they were unsure than the hyperphantasia group. The same 
pattern of results emerged for both male and female participants. Finally, many participants in both 
groups reported that their imagery vividness impacted their relationships (48.7% of people with 
aphantasia, 53% of people with hyperphantasia), attributing a predominantly negative effect (95.5% 
of people with aphantasia, 75.8% of people with hyperphantasia). A chi-square analysis of the 
frequency of the perceived effect of imagery vividness on relationships revealed no difference 
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between the aphantasia and hyperphantasia groups χ² (2, 2158) = 1.514, p = .469. The same results 
emerged when considering males and females separately (Ps > .4). 
3.14 EXTEND study VVVIQ distribution and sibling recurrence risk (Figure 8).  
0.7% of participants in the EXTEND cohort scored 16/80, 2.6% 16-23/80 while 2.6% scored 80/80 and 
11.2% 75-80. The mean score was 58.6 (SD = 13.3) and the median was 60. We used EXTEND study 
data to calculate the sibling recurrence ratio for extreme aphantasia. Within the extreme aphantasia 
group, 21% reported an affected relative, of whom 19% were first degree relatives, and 6.7% were 
siblings, yielding a sibling recurrence risk ratio (lamda S) of 9.6, indicating a roughly tenfold increase 
in the likelihood of aphantasia in siblings by comparison with the general population. 
4. Discussion 
4.1  Key findings 
In keeping with our hypotheses, these data indicate that people lying at the two extremes of the 
spectrum of visual imagery vividness report distinctive behavioural and psychological associations. 
People with hyperphantasia are more likely to be found in professions traditionally regarded as 
creative, while those with aphantasia are more likely to work in computing, mathematics and science. 
Aphantasia, in contrast to hyperphantasia, is reportedly associated with difficulty with face 
recognition, and many people with aphantasia describe impoverished memories of past personal 
events. Conversely, people with hyperphantasia are more likely than those with aphantasia to report 
synaesthesia. When asked to count mentally the number of windows in their home, people with 
hyperphantasia - and mid-range imagery - almost invariably consult a visual image while those with 
aphantasia describe a range of alternative strategies including the use of avisual spatial imagery, 
kinaesthetic imagery and amodal ‘knowledge’. 
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We have also confirmed some anticipated dissociations. Most strikingly, people with aphantasia were 
more likely than those with average or vivid imagery to report an absence of dreams, or a-visual 
dreaming. Nonetheless, a majority (63.4%) of people with aphantasia report that they dream visually, 
in common with 98.5% of people with hyperphantasia and 89% of people with mid-range imagery 
vividness. Most of those who do not dream visually report experiencing dreams in atypical narrative, 
textual, conceptual, auditory and emotional forms. Secondly, while about half (54.2%) of our 
aphantasic participants describe an absence of imagery in any sense modality – absence of the ‘mind’s 
ear’, for example, as well as the mind’s eye – many experience imagery in one or more modalities 
other than vision, most often auditory.  
Sampling from a large community biobank, the EXTEND study (http://exeter.crf.nihr.ac.uk/extend), 
indicates that the prevalence of aphantasia, defined as extreme performance on the most widely used 
measure of imagery vividness,  is around 0.7%, that of hyperphantasia around 2.6% . Individuals with 
extreme imagery typically realise that their experience is unusual at school or in early adult life, those 
with hyperphantasia discovering this earlier than those with aphantasia. The realisation that their 
imagery vividness is exceptional most often dawns when comparing their experience with that of 
friends and family, as a result of media reports, or while engaging in practices, like meditation, that 
often require visualisation. In our large sample, the sex ratio is equal among those with aphantasia, 
while there is a female preponderance among those with hyperphantasia. Participants report a family 
history of aphantasia in first degree relatives more often than would be expected by chance, 
suggesting a possible genetic basis for imagery vividness, although environmental factors very likely 
play a part.  
4.2 Limitations 
These findings derive from first person reports by self-selected participants. Such data are open to a 
range of criticisms. Metacognitive judgements are fallible (Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2007). They may 
be influenced by a range of factors including participants’ folk psychological theories, their 
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assumptions about researchers’ expectations and pervasive confounding factors such as mood. The 
‘self-selection’ by our participants mean that the groups may be unrepresentative in, for example, 
their gender mix. Wide-ranging questionnaire studies of this kind use crude measures for complex 
constructs, such as face recognition and autobiographical memory. Our coding of participant 
responses was not undertaken blind to participant group and involved some judgement calls. Finally, 
it is likely that our two samples, lying at opposite extremes of the vividness spectrum, are 
heterogenous: our group findings may conceal important subgroup and individual differences. We 
briefly discuss each of these limitations in turn. 
Introspective reports must be treated critically by researchers, and are certainly open to a range of 
potentially distorting influences (Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2007). However, just as  ‘disease narratives’ 
are often the point of departure for innovative research in medicine(e.g. Ffytche et al., 1998), so 
introspective reports frequently provide valuable clues in cognitive neuroscience(e.g. Blood & Zatorre, 
2001). In the current study we were impressed by the consistency of the accounts of extreme imagery 
provided across participants who were often describing clusters of phenomena that they had been 
puzzled by for years. Their descriptions did not appear to be strongly influence by psychological theory 
or demand characteristics, and the patterns of response did not suggest any uniform tendency to low 
or high item endorsement. For example individuals describing aphantasia often drew attention to the 
presence of visual imagery in their dreams, or of imagery in other sense modalities, and the emotional 
impact of recognising oneself as experiencing ‘extreme imagery’ did not differ between the two 
groups. We entirely agree that the first person reports provided by our participants require 
triangulation with more objective measures, both behavioural and neural - as we and others have 
done in previous studies of acquired aphantasia(Farah, 1984; Zeman et al., 2010) -  but we believe that 
first person reports nevertheless provide critical, initial, data points. Our participants’ self-selection 
may indeed have influenced some aspects of our data. For example, if women were more likely to 
make contact with us than men, the gender ratios we have described may be misleading. VVIQ data 
from a genuinely community-based sample would remedy this defect.  
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The Imagery Questionnaire employed in the study was an exploratory instrument, informed by the 
accounts provided by the small number of people with aphantasia we had previously encountered. 
Some of the questions we included – such as whether ‘your ability to recall memorable events from 
the past, like holidays or celebrations, [is] normal’ – were indeed coarse-grained. We believe that such 
questions are defensible in the early stages of the exploration of a new phenomenon, and that their 
use was to some extent justified by the significant group differences they revealed. Clearly these 
suggestive findings require closer analysis, using better differentiated questionnaires and more 
objective approaches, as above. ‘Blind’ coding of responses would have been advantageous, but as 
group membership tended to become clear rapidly on review of the questionnaires, it would have 
been difficult to achieve without isolating the responses to individual questions. This approach would 
have exceeded the resources available for this study. We took care to code responses as objectively 
as possible but accept that this process is not entirely objective. We hope, in due course, to be able to 
conduct a replication of the current study using more stringent ‘blinding’ in a replication sample. 
Finally, we, agree that it is likely that both aphantasia and hyperphantasia can occur in a range of 
psychological contexts, and are heterogeneous. We plan to examine patterns of response within the 
data in future work. The current paper describes a ‘first pass’ designed to identify commonalties within 
and differences between the study groups.  
4.3 Future work: validation and underlying mechanisms 
It will be important to investigate the associations we have described using objective measures, 
including tests of face recognition, autobiographical memory and synaesthesia, in future work. Free 
text responses, not presented here, provided alongside the codeable data in our questionnaires, 
suggest that extreme imagery may have affective as well as cognitive associations, in keeping with the 
findings of Wicken et al (Wicken, Keogh & Pearson, 2019), which should also be explored further. The 
resulting objective neuropsychological data, together with patterns of response within the 
questionnaire data, can then be used to identify possible subtypes of extreme imagery.  
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Alongside these behavioural approaches, neural measures have the potential to explicate our 
questionnaire data. Growing understanding of the neural basis of visualisation (Winlove et al., 2018), 
and of its normal variation (Fulford et al., 2018), suggests candidate mechanisms for extreme imagery, 
including alterations in connectivity between the executive control networks that organise mental 
processes and the sensory cortices that represent modality-specific information. The observation in 
our study that many people with aphantasia nevertheless dream visually may be explained by the 
radical differences between the underlying neurobiology of dreaming, a ‘bottom-up’ process, 
orchestrated from the brain stem (Lu, Sherman, Devor, & Saper, 2006), and visualisation, a ‘top-down’ 
process reliant on control networks centred in frontal and parietal cortices (Winlove et al., 2018). The 
variability in the involvement of imagery in other sense modalities suggests that both cross-modality 
and modality specific factors influence imagery vividness.  
As indicated in the Introduction, several studies have already made a start in identifying potential 
objective correlates of aphantasia using behavioural and neural markers, such as loss of the usual 
priming effect of imagery in binocular rivalry (Keogh & Pearson, 2018) and absence of the usual 
autonomic response to stories that would normally be expected to excite emotive imagery (Wicken, 
Keogh & Pearson, 2019). 
Thirdly, the observation that extreme imagery, specifically aphantasia, may occur more frequently 
than would be expected in first degree relatives, hints that there may be a genetic component to 
imagery vividness. This requires substantiation from family studies measuring imagery vividness in 
relatives. If confirmed, a genome-wide association study of imagery vividness in a large participant 
group provides a potential method for identifying relevant genes.  
Future work will also need to address the question of whether ‘extreme imagery’ constitutes a 
disorder. Although aphantasia occasionally occurs as a result of brain injuries or psychiatric conditions 
which impair an existing capacity to visualise (Bartolomeo, 2008; Farah, 1984; Zago et al., 2011), we 
do not at present consider lifelong aphantasia to be a medical disorder, but rather an intriguing 
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variation in human experience, analogous to synaesthesia. We suspect that aphantasia and 
hyperphantasia will prove to have balanced advantages and disadvantages, perhaps reflecting a 
tension between two key modes of human information processing: one episodic and sensorily-rich, 
the other semantic and factual.  
4.4 Invisible differences 
We believe that the description of ‘aphantasia’ and ‘hyperphantasia’ has excited much scientific (e.g. 
Clemens, 2018; Keogh & Pearson, 2018), literary (Miller, 2017), philosophical (D'Aloisio-Montilla, 
2017) and popular (Ross, 2016) interest over the short period since these terms were coined because 
they relate to a fundamental human cognitive act – ‘displaced reference’ (Bickerton, 2014), the 
representation of things and people in their absence. Our data speak to the remarkable, often 
unsuspected, variety of such imaginative experience. While Aristotle wrote that ‘the soul never thinks 
without a phantasma’ (Aristotle., 1968), the existence of aphantasia demonstrates that 
representation is indeed possible in the absence of conscious visual imagery. The delineation of these 
forms of extreme imagery also clarifies a vital distinction between imagery and imagination: people 
with aphantasia - who include the geneticist Craig Venter, the neurologist Oliver Sacks and the creator 
of Firefox, Blake Ross - can be richly imaginative, as visualisation is only one element of this more 








Figure 1: Percentage of participants with aphantasia, hyperphantasia and controls reporting a) good, 
bad or normal autobiographical memory or who were unsure; b) difficulty (poor) or no difficulty 













Figure 2: Percentage of participants with aphantasia, hyperphantasia and controls reporting a) visual 
images in dreams vs those reporting no visual imagery or absence of dreaming; b) that their mood 














Figure 3: Percentage of participants with aphantasia, hyperphantasia and controls reporting a) the use 
of ‘visualisation’ vs ‘non-visualisation’ strategies to count mentally the number of windows in their 
house or apartment vs ‘other’ responses; b) that the vividness of visual imagery is affected by having 



















Figure 4: Percentage of participants with aphantasia and hyperphantasia reporting their occupation 
as being: 1 = Management, 2 = Business and financial; 3 = Computer and mathematical/Life, 
physical, social science; 4 =  Education, training, and library; 5 = Arts, design, entertainment, sports 
and media; 6 = Healthcare, practitioners and technical. Only categories where the percentage 
frequency for either group exceeded 5% are included. A full breakdown of the distribution is 





















Figure 5: a) Percentage of participants with aphantasia and hyperphantasia who became aware of 
their extreme imagery vividness before and after the age of 20 vs those unsure; b) Mode of 














Figure 6: Percentage of participants with aphantasia and hyperphantasia reporting a) affected family 
members; b) that imagery in other sensory modalities was similarly affected (‘all modalities’ implies 














Figure 7: Percentage of participants with aphantasia and hyperphantasia reporting a) perceived 
advantages of their imagery status; b) an emotional impact from the discovery of their imagery 
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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF LIFELONG VISUAL IMAGERY VIVIDNESS EXTREMES 
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL 
Methods 
Questionnaire: As indicated in the main text, the original aphantasia and hyperphantasia 
questionnaires (provided as appendices below) were sent to participants  (n = 1460) via email as Word 
documents. The participants responded using free text. During the course of data gathering we 
converted the Word questionnaires into an on-line format (available at 
https://wh.snapsurveys.com/s.asp?k=149725891417). This version provides drop-down menus for 
responses where possible. One question, relating to ‘difficulty in recognising faces or objects’ was 
changed to ‘difficulty in recognising faces’ as neither aphantasic or hyperphantasic participants 
reported object recognition difficulty. Following spontaneous mention of synaesthesia by several 
participants with hyperphantasia, a question about synaesthesia was added. Control participants 
completed a modified version of the IQ which was administered on-line (provided as an appendix 
below). 
Data coding: Questionnaire data were entered into an Excel spread sheet, and where possible coded 
numerically to allow statistical comparisons. In all cases the data were independently coded by two 
researchers. In rare cases of disagreement, a consensus was agreed with the help of a third researcher.  
The data fields and coding categories were as follows: 
 Visual imagery vividness (VVIQ) – score range 16-80 
 Age - years 
 Sex – male or female 
 Education – initially scored in years of education (we excluded from analysis a small group of 
participants reporting <8 years of education in case these responses were erroneous); 
subsequently using the classifiers Secondary, College, Graduate, Masters, PhD  
 Occupation – coded using the United States Employment Service dictionary of occupational 
titles (https://www.bls.gov/soc/2010/2010_major_groups.htm) 
 Age of discovery – ‘always known’, by decade  or ‘recently discovered’, ‘unsure/not specified’ 
 Mode of discovery – discussion with friends & family, news + social media, school, art, reading, 
imagery exercises, reminiscing, school, unsure/not specified 
 Emotional impact: presence – yes, no, unsure, initially yes - now no, initially no – now yes;  
 Total vs brief flashes: total, brief flashes, unsure (applicable to aphantasia only) 
 Effect of having eyes open vs closed: yes, no, unsure 
 Whether lack/abundance of visual imagery affects imagery in any other senses: all, at least 
one other sense (but not all), none, unsure 
 Dreaming: dreams with visual images, dreams without images, no dreams, unsure  
 Autobiographical memory: normal, good, bad, unsure 
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 Face recognition: difficulty, no difficulty 
 Synaesthesia: yes, no 
 Influence of mood: yes, no, unsure 
 Perceived advantages: yes, no, unsure 
 Effect on relationships: presence – yes, no, unsure; impact - positive, negative 
 Other affected family members: yes, maybe one, no, unsure; if yes, further information was 
requested about the degree of relationship  
 ‘windows’ question: visualisation responses = visualise walking round inside of home, visualise 
walking round outside of home; non-visualisation responses = from memory, ‘walk, no image’, 
spatial knowledge, experience with windows (e.g. from cleaning them), knowledge of 
direction from which light falls; other  
Results 
Here we provide analyses of gender-specific data, where these are absent from the main text, and 
additional analyses comparing the extreme (VVIQ 16/80) and moderate (VVIQ 17-23/80) aphantasia 
and hyperphantasia (extreme 80/80, moderate 75-79) groups.  
Autobiographical memory. When considering male participants alone, the significant difference 
across groups still emerged, χ² (6, 1076) = 74.933, p<.001. For the post-hoc comparisons, the 
hyperphantasia group were more likely to say they had a good memory than expected by chance. In 
contrast, the aphantasia group were more likely to complain of having a bad memory than either the 
hyperphantasia or control groups. The control group were significantly more likely to say that their 
memory was normal than the aphantasia group. For females, there was also a significant difference in 
the distribution across groups, χ² (6, 1213) = 160.408, p<.001. The same basic pattern as for the all-
participant analysis emerged, with the aphantasia group reporting elevated levels of poor memory 
compared to both the hyperphantasia and control groups, while the hyperphantasia group reported 
significantly higher levels of good memory compared to the aphantasia group. Controls reported that 
their memory was normal significantly more than the aphantasia group. There was no significant 
difference in the distribution of memory ratings between the extreme aphantasia and moderate 
aphantasia groups or the extreme hyperphantasia and moderate hyperphantasia groups (both Ps > 
.25). 
Face recognition. The same basic pattern emerged in male participants, χ² (2, 997) = 15.389, p <.001, 
with the aphantasia group reporting significantly elevated levels of complaints about their face 
recognition compared to the hyperphantasia group. The control group here, though, did not differ 
from the expected values. Female participants also demonstrated a difference between groups, χ² (2, 
1059) = 82.351, p <.001, the aphantasia group reporting worse face recognition than both the 
hyperphantasia and control groups. There were no differences between either the extreme 
aphantasia and moderate aphantasia groups or the extreme hyperphantasia and moderate 
hyperphantasia groups (both Ps > .7). 
Visual imagery in dreams. The same basic pattern emerged for male and female participants. The 
overall chi-square was highly significant in both cases (Ps<.001) and the post-hoc comparisons 
revealed in both the male and female groups that those with aphantasia were less likely to experience 
visual images in dreams than either the hyperphantasia or control groups. There was a significant 
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difference between the extreme aphantasia and moderate aphantasia groups, χ² (1, 1998) = 20.060, 
p <.001, with the extreme aphantasia group significantly less likely to report having experienced visual 
images in dreams than the moderate aphantasia group. There were no differences between the 
extreme hyperphantasia and moderate hyperphantasia groups, χ² (1, 200) = .008, p = .930. 
Influence of mood. There was a significant difference between the extreme aphantasia and moderate 
aphantasia groups, χ² (2, 1998) = 14.967, p =.001. Post-hoc comparisons revealed that the extreme 
aphantasia group reported that mood influenced their visual imagery less than the moderate 
aphantasia group.  There was no difference between the extreme hyperphantasia group and the 
moderate hyperphantasia group, χ² (2, 199) = 1.765, p =.414. 
Synaesthesia. There was no difference in prevalence of synesthesia either between people with 
extreme aphantasia and moderate aphantasia or people with extreme hyperphantasia and moderate 
aphantasia (both Ps > .1). 
The ‘windows task’. There was a significant difference in distribution between the extreme aphantasia 
and moderate aphantasia groups, χ² (2, 1884) = 12.530, p = .002, with participants in the extreme 
aphantasia group significantly less likely to use a visualization strategy and more likely to use a non-
visualization strategy than people with moderate aphantasia. There were no differences between the 
extreme hyperphantasia and moderate hyperphantasia groups, χ² (2, 182) = 1.752, p = .417. 
Effect of eye opening. There was a significant difference between the extreme aphantasia group and 
the moderate aphantasia group, χ² (2, 1998) = 38.065, p <.001. Post-hoc analyses revealed that the 
extreme aphantasia group reported that closing their eyes influenced their visual imagery less than 
the moderate aphantasia group. There was no significant difference between the extreme and 
moderate hyperphantasia groups, (2, 200) = 4.698, p = .095. 
Occupation.  For male participants, there was a trend for a difference between groups, χ² (21, 867) = 
35.204, p = .027, but this did not survive corrections for multiple comparisons. For females, there was 
a significant difference between groups, χ² (21, 801) = 60.355, p <.001, with post-hoc analyses showing 
that, people with aphantasia were less likely to be in the “Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and 
Media Occupations” category than hyperphantasia participants but there were no other significant 
differences. There were no differences between extreme aphantasia participants and moderate 
aphantasia participants (p = .469) and whilst there was a trend for a difference between extreme 
hyperphantasia participants and moderate hyperphantasia participants (p = .023), this did not survive 
corrections for multiple comparisons. 
Age and mode of discovery. For age of discovery, there was a trend for a difference between extreme 
aphantasia and moderate aphantasia participants (p = .023) but this did not survive corrections for 
multiple comparisons. There was no difference between the extreme hyperphantasia and moderate 
hyperphantasia groups (p = .283). For mode of discovery, there were significant differences across 
groups when comparing males and females separately (both Ps<.001). However, whilst the post-hoc 
analyses revealed that for females, people with hyperphantasia were significantly more likely to have 
become aware of their condition through art than people with aphantasia, male hyperphantasics were 
significantly more likely to have become aware of their condition in school than male aphantasics. 
There were no significant differences between the extreme aphantasia and moderate aphantasia 
groups, χ² (8, 1928) = 6.891, p =.548, but there were between the extreme hyperphantasia and 
moderate hyperphantasia groups, χ² (8, 195) = 23.881, p =.002. Post-hoc comparisons indicated that 
there was greater recognition of the condition during school for people with extreme hyperphantasia 
than moderate hyperphantasia. No other differences approached significance. 
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Family history. There was also a significant difference between groups when considering just the male 
participants, χ² (3, 1029) = 31.575, p <.001, with hyperphantasia participants more likely to say that 
“Maybe one” family member was affected than aphantasia participants. No other comparisons were 
statistically significant. There was also a significant effect for females, χ² (3, 1080) = 28.500, p <.001, 
with post-hoc analyses revealing that people with aphantasia were more likely to say that “no family 
members” had the same condition than hyperphantasia participants. No other differences were 
significant. There was no difference in distribution of responses between the extreme aphantasia and 
moderate aphantasia groups, χ² (3, 1945) = 6.875,  p=.076. There was a trend for a difference between 
the extreme hyperphantasia and moderate aphantasia groups, χ² (3, 192) = 9.353, p=.025, but this did 
not survive corrections for multiple comparisons. 
Other modalities of imagery. There was a difference in distribution between the extreme aphantasia 
and moderate aphantasia groups, χ² (2, 1949) = 40.407, p <.001. Post-hoc comparisons revealed that 
people with extreme aphantasia were more likely to say that all other modalities were affected than 
people with moderate aphantasia. In contrast, people with moderate aphantasia were more likely to 
indicate that some, but not all, modalities were affected than people with extreme aphantasia. 
Emotional impact, perceived advantages, relationships. There was no difference in emotional impact 
when considering males and females separately (Ps > .5). There was also no difference between 
extreme aphantasia and moderate aphantasia (p = .471) or extreme hyperphantasia and moderate 
hyperphantasia (p = .545). With regard to perceived advantages, there was no difference between the 
extreme aphantasia and moderate aphantasia groups (p = .179) while there was a trend for a 
difference between the extreme hyperphantasia and moderate hyperphantasia groups (p = .022) 
which did not survive corrections for multiple comparisons. For the effect on relationships, there was 
no difference between extreme aphantasia and moderate aphantasia (p = .471) or extreme 
hyperphantasia and moderate hyperphantasia (p = .545). 
Total lack vs brief flashes (Figure S1). This variable applied only to people with aphantasia. The 
proportion of people in the extreme aphantasia and moderate aphantasia groups who reported their 
lack of visual imagery as being total vs having brief flashes of imagery is presented in Figure S1. A 
contingency chi-square revealed that there was a significant difference between the extreme and 
moderate aphantasia groups, χ² (2,2000) = 96.671, p <.001. Post-hoc analyses revealed that the 
extreme aphantasia group were more likely to report that their lack of visual imagery was total whilst 







Table S1 Occupations in participants with aphantasia and hyperphantasia  
 Aphantasia  (%) Hyperphantasia 
(% ) 
Management 10.1 7.0 
Business and financial  4.2 5.5 
Computer and mathematical/ Life, physical and social 
science 
20.8 11.5 
Architecture and engineering 4.6 4.5 
Community and social service 1.8 3.0 
Legal 2.0 2.5 
Education, training, and library 11.2 10.5 
Arts, design, entertainment, sports and media 8.2 28 
Healthcare, practitioners and technical 4.6 5 
Healthcare support 0.5 0.5 
Protective services 0.7 0 
Food preparation and serving 0.7 1.5 
Building and grounds cleaning and maintenance 0.2 0 
Personal care and service .85 0.5 
Sales and related occupations 2.6 0.5 
Office and admin support 3.1 3.5 
Farming, fishing and forestry 0.2 0 
Construction and extraction 0.8 1 
Installation, maintenance, and repair 0.5 0.5 
Production 0.5 0 
Transportation and material moving 0.7 0.5 
Military specific 0.6 0.5 









Figure S1 Percentage of participants with extreme vs moderate aphantasia reporting the complete 

































1 VIVIDNESS OF VISUAL IMAGERY QUESTIONNAIRE (VVIQ) 
For each item on this questionnaire, try to form a visual image, and consider your experience 
carefully.  For any image that you do experience, rate how vivid it is using the five-point scale 
described below.  If you do not have a visual image, rate vividness as ‘1’.  Only use ‘5’ for images that 
are truly as lively and vivid as real seeing.  Please note that there are no right or wrong answers to 
the questions, and that it is not necessarily desirable to experience imagery or, if you do, to have 
more vivid imagery. 
 
Perfectly clear and vivid as real seeing   5 
Clear and reasonably vivid    4 
Moderately clear and lively    3 
Vague and dim      2 
No image at all, you only “know” that you are 
thinking of the object     1 
 
For items 1-4, think of some relative or friend whom you frequently see (but who is not with you at 
present) and consider carefully the picture that comes before your mind’s eye. 
1. The exact contour of face, head, shoulders and body  _______________ 
2. Characteristic poses of head, attitudes of body etc.  _______________ 
3. The precise carriage, length of step etc., in walking  _______________ 
4. The different colours worn in some familiar clothes  _______________ 
 
Visualise a rising sun.  Consider carefully the picture that comes before your mind’s eye. 
5. The sun rising above the horizon into a hazy sky   _______________ 
6. The sky clears and surrounds the sun with blueness  _______________ 
7. Clouds.  A storm blows up with flashes of lightning  _______________ 
8. A rainbow appears      _______________ 
 
Think of the front of a shop which you often go to.  Consider the picture that comes before your 
mind’s eye. 
9. The overall appearance of the shop from the opposite side 
 of the road       _______________ 
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10. A window display including colours, shapes and details 
 Of individual items for sale     _______________ 
11.         You are near the entrance.  The colour, shape and  
               details of the door.      _______________ 
12.         You enter the shop and go to the counter. The counter 
 assistant serves you.  Money changes hands   _______________ 
 
Finally think of a country scene which involves trees, mountains and a lake.  Consider the picture 
that comes before your mind’s eye.      
13. The contours of the landscape     _______________ 
14.  The colour and shape of the trees    _______________ 
15. the colour and shape of the lake    _______________ 
16. A strong wind blows on the trees and on the lake causing 
  waves in the water.      _______________ 
 
2 IMAGERY QUESTIONNAIRE (original version for participants with aphantasia)  
Age 
Gender 
Handedness (hand used to write with) 
Years of full-time education 
Profession 
Country of residence (+ county if in UK) 
When did you become aware that you were unable to form mental images? 
How did you become aware of this? 
Did this discovery have an emotional impact on you? 
Is your lack of visual imagery total, or do you sometimes experience brief flashes of imagery? 
Is your ability to imagine affected by whether your eyes are open or closed? 
Does your mood influence your ability to form images? 
Are all types of imagery affected, or can you imagine sounds (including music), textures (by imagined 
touch), tastes or smells? 
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1People with synaesthesia describe a ’mixing of the senses’ – for example, letters, words or numbers 
may be involuntarily perceived in colour,  or a sound might seem to have a smell.  
Do you experience synaesthesia?  
Do you dream normally, and in particular do you see visual images in dreams? 
Is your ability to recall memorable events from the past, like holidays or celebrations, normal? 
Do you have any difficulty in recognising objects or faces? 
*Do you think that your lack of a ‘mind’s eye’ has had any other effect on your thought processes? 
*Did it affect your career choice? 
Has it had an effect on your relationships (for example by making it more difficult to reminisce, or to 
imagine the faces of loved ones)? 
Do you think that your lack of a mind’s eye has had any particular advantages? 
Do you have any relatives who have similarly noticed that they lack a mind’s eye? 
*Have you developed any strategies to compensate for the lack of a mind’s eye?  
Please count the number of windows in your house or apartment. How do you do this? Do you 
inspect an image of your house or apartment as you perform this task? 
*Is there any particular aspect of this topic that you would like us to look into further?  
Might you be willing to take part in further research on this topic? 
Do you have any other comments? 
Thank you very much for your help! 
1 This question was included in only a subset of the questionnaires completed by aphantasic 
participants 
*We do not report the responses to these open-ended questions here 





Handedness (hand used to write with) 
 






Country of residence (+ county if in UK) 
 
When did you become aware that your visual imagery is exceptionally vivid? 
 
How did you become aware of this? 
 
Did this discovery have an emotional impact on you? 
 
Is your ability to imagine affected by whether your eyes are open or closed? 
 
Does your mood influence the vividness of your imagery? 
 
Does your vivid imagination extend to the other senses, for example to vividly imagined sounds, 
textures, tastes and smells? 
 
People with synaesthesia describe a ’mixing of the senses’ – for example, letters, words or numbers 
may be involuntarily  perceived in colour,  or a sound might seem to have a smell. Do you experience 
synaesthesia?  
 
Do you dream normally, and in particular do you see visual images in dreams? 
 
Is your ability to recall memorable events from the past, like holidays or celebrations, normal? 
 
Do you have any difficulty in recognising objects or faces? 
 
*Do you think that your vivid imagery has had any other effect on your thought processes or 
emotions? 
 
*Did it affect your career choice? 
 




Do you think that your vivid imagery has had any particular advantages? 
 
Do you have any relatives who also report especially vivid imagery? 
 
Please count the number of windows in your house or apartment. How do you do this? Do you 
inspect an image of your house or apartment as you perform this task? 
 
*Is there any particular aspect of this topic that you would like us to look into further?  
 
Might you be willing to take part in further research on this topic? 
 
Do you have any other comments? 
 
Thank you very much for your help! 
 
*We do not report the responses to these open-ended questions here 
 
4  CONTROL QUESTIONNAIRE 
Age  
 Sex at birth 
Dominant hand (hand used to write with) 
Highest level of full-time education reached 
Are you currently Employed, Unemployed, Retired or a Student? 
Country of residence 
Is your ability to visualise affected by whether your eyes are open or closed? 
Does your mood influence your ability to form visual images? 
Can you imagine sounds (including music), textures (by imagined touch), tastes or smells? 
People with synaesthesia describe a ’mixing of the senses’ – for example, letters, words or numbers 
may be involuntarily perceived in colour,  or a sound might seem to have a smell. Do you experience 
synaesthesia? 
Do you dream normally, and in particular, do you see visual images in dreams? 
Is your ability to recall memorable events from the past, like holidays or celebrations, normal? 
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Do you have any difficulty in recognising faces? 
Please count the number of windows in your house or apartment in your head (without physically 
looking at it). How do you do this? More specifically, do you inspect an image of your house or 
apartment as you perform this task? 
Would you be willing to take part in further research on this topic? 
Do you have any other comments? 
 
 
 
